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Comparative Negligence As Applied To Contribution:
The New Doctrine of "Comparative Contribution"
Plaintiff sued Defendant and Defendant's insurer to recover
damages for personal injuries sustained when the car driven by
Plaintiff's husband, in which Plaintiff was a passenger, collided with
the car driven by Defendant. Defendant and his insurer impleaded
the husband's insurer and counterclaimed for contribution. The jury
found that although the Defendant was not grossly negligent, he
was negligent' when he failed to yield the right of way. The jury
also found the Plaintiff's husband negligent because of his excessive
speed, and apportioned ninety-five per cent of the total negligence
to Defendant and five per cent to the husband.' The trial court
awarded Plaintiff a judgment for 25,000 dollars. Defendant's in-
surer obtained a judgment for contribution against the husband's
insurer for one-half of that amount. The husband's insurer appealed.
Held, reversed: (1) Tortfeasors sustaining a common liability by
reason of negligence are now held responsible for contribution in
proportion to the percentage of negligence attributable to each. (2)
However, a plaintiff can recover from any of the joint tortfeasors the
total amount of damage to which he is entitled without regard to
the percentage of negligence attributable to such tortfeasor. (3)
"Gross" negligence is abolished; conduct previously characterized as
gross negligence will be treated as ordinary negligence for purposes
of comparison and contribution and for all other purposes. Bielski
v. Schulze, 16 Wis. 2d 1, 114 N.W.2d 105 (1962).
I. THE DOCTRINE OF COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE
The doctrine of comparative negligence is designed to avoid the
severities of the doctrine of contributory negligence.! Under the
theory of contributory negligence, a plaintiff is barred from any
recovery when his careless conduct contributes as a legal cause to
the harm he suffers.' However, in similar instances he is allowed
some recovery under the doctrine of comparative negligence,' because
The term "negligence" is employed hereafter to indicate only that negligence which
operates as a legal or proximate cause of the injuries in issue. Illinois Cent. Ry. v. Porter,
207 Fed. 311 (6th Cir. 1913); Prosser, Torts § 47 (2d ed. 1955).
'Wisconsin adopted a comparative negligence statute in 1931. The act is now found in
Wis. Stat. Ann. § 331.045 (1958).
8Prosser, Torts § 53 (2d ed. 1955).
' Looney v. Metropolitan R.R., 200 U.S. 480 (1906); Restatement, Torts § 463 (1934);
Prosser, Torts § 51 (2d ed. 1955).
'Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Kennedy, 153 Ark. 77, 239 S.W. 376 (1922); 38 Am. Jur.
Negligence § 231 (1941).
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damages are apportioned between the plaintiff and the defendant ac-
cording to the amount of negligence attributable to each.! In other
words, a plaintiff is compensated for his total injury less an amount
that corresponds to the proportion which his negligence bears to the
combined negligence of both parties. A defendant, consequently, is
liable in the proportion that his negligence bears to the combined
negligence of both parties. The degree of negligence attributable to
a party is not to be measured by the character of the negligent acts
nor by the number of respects in which he is found to have been
at fault; rather, the conduct of the parties considered as a whole
controls."
When the plaintiff's -negligence is determined to be of a greater
degree than that of the defendant, a majority of those jurisdictions
which have some type of comparative negligence provision' allow
the plaintiff to recover irrespective of the amount of his negligence.!
However, in some jurisdictions, he can recover only when his
negligence is slight and the defendant's negligence is gross in com-
parison; 10 in others, the plaintiff is denied recovery only if he is
found grossly negligent." Two jurisdictions permit recovery only
'Whatley v. Henry, 16 S.E.2d 214 (1941); Prosser, Torts § 54 (2d ed. 1955); 38 Am.
Jur. Negligence § 231 (1941).
7 Taylor v. Western Cas. & Sur. Co., 270 Wis. 408, 71 N.W.2d 363 (1955). Frank,
Collisions at Sea, 12 L.Q. Rev. 260 (1896), in his discussion of comparative negligence in
maritime law, states: "The system, then, is not an attempt to convert a collision case into
a mathematical problem, where every act shall be given its numerical value and the total
number of marks obtained by each side added up and compared at the end. It is not a
question of algebra, but of common sense." Id. at 264.
'For a list of jurisdictions with comparative negligence statutes of general application
see note 17 infra. See the next textual paragraph for a discussion of the various applications
of the doctrine.
IArizona: Grasty v. Sabin, 32 Ariz. 463, 259 Pac. 1049 (1927); Arkansas: Goodwin v.
Boyd-Sicaral Coal Co., 197 Ark. 175, 122 S.W.2d 548 (1938) (applying state employers'
liability act); Florida: Cline v. Powell, 141 Fla. 119, 192 So. 628 (1939); Kansas: Rockhold
v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry., 97 Kan. 715, 156 Pac. 775 (1916); Minnesota: Stritzke v.
Chicago, Great W. Ry., 190 Minn. 323, 251 N.W. 532 (1933); Mississippi: Yazoo & Miss.
Valley R.R. v. Williams, 114 Miss. 236, 74 So. 835 (1917); North Carolina: Hines v.
Atlantic Line Ry., 185 N.C. 72, 116 S.E. 175 (1923); North Dakota: Bauer v. Great
No. Ry., 40 N.D. 542, 169 N.W. 84 (1918); Oregon: Straub v. Oregon Elec. Ry., 163 Ore.
93, 94 Pac. 2d 681 (1939); South Carolina: Boyleston v. Southern Ry., 211 S.C. 232, 44
S.E.2d 537 (1947); Texas: Cameron & Co. v. Thompson, 175 S.W.2d 307 (Tex. Civ. App.
1943)error ref.; Virginia: Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. Mizelle, 136 Va. 237, 118 S.E. 241
(1923); and Wyoming: Hines v. Sweeney, 28 Wyo. 57, 201 Pac. 165 (1921).
" District of Columbia: Powell v. Wisconsin Cent. Ry., 159 Fed. 864 (8th Cir. 1908);
Nebraska: Fairchild v. Sorenson, 165 Neb. 667, 87 N.W.2d 235 (1957); Nevada: (no case
was found); Ohio: Standard Steel Tube Co. v. Prusakicueicz, 87 Ohio St. 472, 102 N.E.
1131 (Sup. Ct. 1912); South Dakota: Stevenson v. Douros, 58 S.D. 268, 235 N.W. 707
(1931).
" Georgia: Charleston & W.C.R.R. v. Brown, 40 Ga. 760, 79 S.E. 932 (1913); Iowa:
Hunter v. Colfax Consol. Coal Co., 175 Iowa 245, 157 N.W. 145 (1916); Michigan:
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when the plaintiff's negligence is not as great as that of the de-
fendant."2
Comparative negligence is applied in a number of situations. The
Federal Employer's Liability Act 3 recognizes the doctrine in actions
involving interstate railroad employees. The Supreme Court in
Lindgren v. United States4 held that the provisions of the FELA
applied to the Merchant Marine Act of 1920" and thereby extended
the comparative negligence doctrine to federal maritime law. A
number of states have enacted employer's liability statutes which
contain comparative negligence provisions." However, only five states
have comparative negligence statutes of general application. 7
The effect of gross negligence varies under the Federal Employer's
Liability Act, the state employer's liability acts, and the five juris-
dictions with statutes of general application. Under the federal Act"
and in one state, 9 it has been held that the doctrine of comparative
negligence applies to all forms of negligence, including gross negli-
gence. Two states0 apply gross negligence in a comparative sense,
i.e., slight negligence on the part of the plaintiff does not defeat re-
covery if by comparison the negligence of the defendant is gross."
The fourth state" requires that in order for a plaintiff to recover
damages his negligence must be less than the negligence of the de-
Lydman v. DeHaas, 185 Mich. 128, 151 N.W. 718 (1915); Montana: Nicholson v. Roundup
Coal Mining Co., 79 Mont. 358, 257 Pac. 270 (1927).
12Arkansas: Sunday v. Burk, 172 F. Supp. 722 (W.D. Ark. 1959); Wisconsin: Garithier
v. Carbonneau, 226 Wis. 527, 277 N.W. 135 (1938).
13 35 Stat. 66 (1908), 45 U.S.C. § 53 (1959).
14 281 U.S. 38 (1930).
541 Stat. 988 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 861 (1959).
16Arizona: Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 23-806 (1956); Arkansas: Ark. Star. Ann. § 81-1202
(1960); District of Columbia: D.C. Code Ann. § 44-402 (Supp. 1961); Florida: Fla. Star.
Ann. § 768.06 (1944); Georgia: Ga. Code Ann. S 66-402 (1937); Iowa: Iowa Code §
85.15 (1958); Kansas: Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 66-238 (1949); Michigan: Mich. Stat. Ann. §
17.141 (1960); Minnesota: Minn. Stat. Ann. § 219.79 (1947); Montana: Mont. Rev. Codes
Ann. 5 92-201 (1949); Nevada: Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.150 (1957); North Carolina: N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 60-67 (1960); North Dakota: N.D. Cent. Code § 49-16-03 (1960); Ohio: Ohio
Rev. Code Ann. 5 4113.07 (Page 1954); Oregon: Ore. Rev. Star. § 764.220 (1953);
South Carolina: S.C. Code 5 58-1232 (1952); South Dakota: S.D. Code §5 33.04A01-10
(Supp. 1945); Texas: Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 6440 (1926); Virginia: Va. Code
Ann. § 8-642 (1950); Wyoming: Wyo. Star. Ann. § 37-225 (1959).
'"Arkansas: Ark. Stat. Ann. § 81-1202 (1960); Mississippi: Miss. Code Ann. 5 1454
(1942); Nebraska: Neb. Rev. Star. § 25-1151 (1956); South Dakota: S.D. Code 55
33.04A01-10 (Supp. 1945); Wisconsin: Wis. Star. Ann. § 331.045 (1958).
"Pennsylvania Co. v. Cole, 214 Fed. 948 (6th Cir. 1914).
'"Mississippi: Yazoo & Miss. Valley R.R. v. Williams, 114 Miss. 236, 74 So. 835 (1917).
"
5 Nebraska: Fairchild v. Sorenson, 165 Neb. 667, 87 N.W.2d 235 (1957); South
Dakota: Stevenson v. Dovros, 58 S.D. 268, 235 N.W. 707 (1931).
"Fairchild v. Sorenson, supra note 20. In Ruby v. Auker, 151 Neb. 121, 37 N.W.2d
799, 800 (1949), the court stated: "[T]he negligence of the parties is to be compared one
with the other in determining slight and gross negligence."
"Arkansas: Sunday v. Burk, 172 F. Supp. 722 (W.D. Ark. 1959) (applying general
comparative negligence statute).
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fendant. The fifth state, Wisconsin, until March of 1962, treated
gross negligence as different from ordinary negligence in kind and
not degree,3 and thus a plaintiff's gross negligence barred the ap-
plication of the comparative negligence statute. 4 However, in the
principal case Wisconsin abolished the concept of gross negligence,
and what was formerly treated as gross negligence is now considered
as a high degree of ordinary negligence for purposes of comparison
and contribution.1
II. CONTRIBUTION AMONG JOINT TORTFEASORS
The concept of contribution among joint tortfeasors is an equitable
doctrine2 ' based on natural justice." Contribution determines the
distribution of a loss between two or more parties who are jointly
liable for having committed a tort against a third party. s Before its
application to the field of torts, the doctrine was well recognized in
suretyship"5 and maritime law. However, in the field of torts con-
tribution has been limited to actions based upon negligence and strict
liability"5 ever since the leading case of Merryweather v. Nixon."2
There the King's Bench promulgated the "no-contribution" rule,
holding that joint tortfeasors who are intentional wrongdoers are
not deserving of the aid of the courts in achieving equal or propor-
tional distribution of the common burden. Although the Merry-
weather rule is uniformly followed in connection with intentional
23Bentson v. Brown, 186 Wis. 629, 203 N.W. 380 (1925). Gross negligence was defined
as conduct of such a reckless and wanton type as to be equivalent to an intention to inflict
injury. Ibid. Hence, under this concept of gross negligence, the plaintiff was allowed to
recover punitive damages which were over and above any actual damages he may have
suffered. Grace v. McArthur, 76 Wis. 641, 45 N.W. 518 (1890); cf. Florida E. Coast Ry.
v. McRoberts, 111 Fla. 278, 149 So. 631 (1933); Miller v. Rambo, 74 N.J.L. 213, 64 Atl.
1053 (Ct. Err. & App. 1906). The additional damages punished the wrongdoer and dis-
couraged others from engaging in the same conduct. Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis. 2d 1, 114
N.W.2d 105, 113, (1962); cf. Monongahela Nay. Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312
(1893); Neal v. Newburger Co., 154 Miss. 591, 123 So. 861 (1929); Norel v. Grochowski,
51 R.I. 376, 155 Atl. 357 (1931); Restatement, Torts § 908 (1939).
24Gauthier v. Carbonneau, 226 Wis. 527, 277 N.W. 135 (1938).
2' 114 N.W.2d at 113.
' Drummond v. Drummond, 232 Ala. 401, 168 So. 428 (1936); Taylor v. Joiner, 180
Ark. 869, 24 S.W.2d 326 (1930); Hunt v. Starks, 256 Ky. 120, 75 S.W.2d 787 (1934).
2 Exchange Elevator Co. v. Marshall, 147 Neb. 48, 22 N.W.2d 403 (1946).
' Wait v. Pierce, 191 Wis. 202, 209 N.W. 475 (1926); 13 Am. Jur. Contributions
S 2 (1938). According to one court, "the object of contribution is to spread the loss among
all parties responsible for the damage, thereby preventing the unjust enrichment of one
tortfeasor at the expense of another." State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Continental Cas.
Co., 264 Wis. 493, 59 N.W.2d 425, 429 (1953).
" Schindel v. Danzer, 161 Md. 384, 157 Atl. 283 (1931); Houston v. Bain, 170 Va. 378,
196 S.E. 657 (1938).
"°The North Star, 106 U.S. 17 (1882); The Atlas, 93 U.S. 302 (1876); The Schooner
Catherine, 58 U.S. 170 (1855).
" 52 Am. Jur. Torts § 123 (1944).
321 Camp. 345, 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (K.B. 1799).
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torts, 3 in the case of negligent torts, seven jurisdictions34 have al-
lowed contribution in one form or another by court decision. Twenty
states" by legislation have adopted the concept of contribution for
general application to negligence cases.
In the states which allow contribution, two different rules are
applied for the purpose of determining the number of contributing
tortfeasors: the "common law" rule and the "equity" rule. The
"ccommon law" rule provides that the number of persons commonly
liable automatically determines the pro rata share of each in the con-
tribution proceedings." Under the "equity" rule, the pro rata shares
are determined on the basis of the number of tortfeasors commonly
liable who are available within the jurisdiction of the forum and who
are financially solvent.' The "equity" rule, or a slight modification
thereof, prevails in most jurisdictions that allow contribution be-
tween joint tortfeasors. s
The 1939 version of the Uniform Contribution Among Tort-
feasors Act, 9 which has been adopted in eight states," defines joint
tortfeasors as "two or more persons jointly or severally liable
"Prosser, Torts 5 46 (2d ed. 1955). An exception to the application of the Merry-
weather rule to intentional torts was the first Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors
Act (1939). See text accompanying note 39 infra. But the 1939 Act was withdrawn in
favor of the Revised Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act (1955) which in S
1(c) does exclude intentional wrongdoers.
"4District of Columbia: Knell v. Feltman, 174 F.2d 662 (D.C. Cir. 1949); Iowa:
Hathaway v. Sioux City, 244 Iowa 508, 57 N.W.2d 228 (1953); Louisiana: Quatray v.
Wicker, 178 La. 289, 151 So. 208 (1933); Maine: Hobbs v. Hurley, 117 Me. 449, 104
Atl. 815 (1918); Minnesota: Underwriters at Lloyds v. Smith, 166 Minn. 388, 208 N.W.
13 (1926); Tennessee: Davis v. Broad St. Garage, 191 Tenn. 320, 232 S.W.2d 355 (1950);
Wisconsin: Ellis v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 167 Wis. 392, 167 N.W. 1048 (1918).
"' Arkansas: Ark. Stat. Ann. § 34-1001 to -1009 (1962); Delaware: Del. Code Ann.
tit. 10, §§ 6301-08 (1953); Georgia: Ga. Code Ann. § 105-2012 (Supp. 1960); Hawaii:
Hawaii Rev. Laws § 246-11 (1955); Kansas: Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 60-3437 (1949);
Kentucky: Ky. Rev. Stat. § 412-030 (1960); Maryland: Md. Ann. Code art. 50, §§ 16-24
(1957); Michigan: Mich. Star. Ann. § 27.1683(4) (1954); Mississippi: Miss. Code Ann.
§ 334 (1957); Missouri: Mo. Ann. Stat. § 537.060 (1953); New Jersey: N.J. Rev. Stat.
§ 2A:53A-2 (1952); New Mexico: N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 24-1-11 to -18 (1953); North
Carolina: N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-240 (1945); North Dakota: N.D. Cent. Code § 32-38-01
(1960); Pennsylvania: Pa. Star. Ann. tit. 12, § 808 (1953); Rhode Island: R.I. Gen. Laws
Ann. §§ 10-6-2 to -11 (1956); South Dakota: S.D. Code §§ 33.04A01-10 (Supp. 1945);
Texas: Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 2212 (1950); Virginia: Va. Code Ann. § 8-627
(1950); West Virginia: W. Va. Code Ann. § 5482 (Supp. 1961).
' 1939 Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act § 2, Comm'rs Note (1), 9 Unif.
Laws Ann. 235 (1957).
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
" Hereafter referred to as the 1939 Uniform Act.
4'Arkansas: Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 34-1001 to -1009 (1947); Delaware: Del. Code Ann.
tit. 10, §§ 6301-08 (1953); Hawaii: Hawaii Rev. Laws § 246-11 (1955); Maryland: Md.
Ann. Code art. 50, §§ 16-24 (1957); New Mexico: N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 24-1-11 to -18
(1953); Pennsylvania: Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 808 (1953); Rhode Island: R.I. Gen. Laws
Ann. §§ 10-6-2 to -11 (1956); South Dakota: S.D. Code §§ 33.04A01-10 (Supp. 1945).
All of these statutes were in effect at the date of this writing.
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in tort for the same injury to person or property, whether or not
judgment has been recovered against all or some of them."'" Under
this Act, one joint tortfeasor has a right to contribution only after
he has either discharged the common liability or has paid more than
his pro rata share."2 Intentional, willful, and wanton actors are not
excluded. 3 The 1939 Uniform Act applies the "common law" rule
to determine the pro rata share among the joint tortfeasors." With
respect to the application of the doctrine of comparative negligence
to the right to contribution ("comparative contribution") ,4  an
optional provision46 included in the 1939 Uniform Act provides for
a consideration of the relative degrees of fault of the joint tortfeasors
in determining their shares. Of the eight states47 which adopted the
1939 Uniform Act, only four" adopted the optional provision.
The 19 5 5 Revised Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act,4"
which applies the "equity" rule,'0 has been adopted in one juris-
diction." The 1955 Revised Uniform Act deletes the optional section
and provides that relative degrees of fault shall not be considered."
The Commissioners state3 that the better argument in favor of the
comparative contribution section disappeared when intentional, will-
ful, and wanton actors were denied the right to contribution under
the Revised Uniform Act. 4
As indicated above, under the Revised Uniform Act an intentional
or grossly negligent tortfeasor is denied the right of contribution.
This seems to be the general rule among the states that have a "com-
41 1939 Uniform Act § 1.
42 1939 Uniform Act § 2(2).
43 1939 Uniform Act § 2, Comm'rs Note (1), 9 Unif. Laws Ann. 235 (1957); see also
note 33 supra.
44 1939 Uniform Act § 2; see text accompanying note 36 supra.
4' This concept or doctrine is hereafter referred to as the "comparative contribution"
doctrine.
46 The 1939 Uniform Act § 2(4) states: "When there is such a disproportion of fault
among joint tortfeasors as to render inequitable an equal distribution among them of the
common liability by contribution, the relative degrees of fault of the joint tortfeasors shall
be considered in determining their pro rata shares." Obviously, the Commissioners do not
use the term "pro rata" to mean "equal" shares. See Black, Law Dictionary 1364 (4th ed.
1957).
47 See note 40 supra.
4' Arkansas: Ark. Stat. Ann. S 34-1002(4) (1947) (See Louisiana-Nevada Transit Co.
v. Ozan Lumber Co., - Ark. - 360 S.W.2d 120 (1962), for a recent example of the
application of the section.); Delaware: Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 6302(d) (1953); Hawaii:
Hawaii Rev. Laws § 246-11 (1955); South Dakota: S.D. Code S 33.04A01 (Supp. 1945).
499 Unif. Laws Ann. 68 (Supp. 1961), hereafter referred to as the Revised Uniform Act.
50 Revised Uniform Act § 2(c); see text accompanying note 37 supra.
"North Dakota: N.D. Cent. Code § 32-38-01 (1960).
"0 Revised Uniform Act 5 2(a).
" Revised Uniform Act 5 1, Comm'rs Note, 9 Unif. Laws Ann. 69 (Supp. 1961).
"Revised Uniform Act 1(c).
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mon law" pro rata contribution statute."5 There is still common
liability, but because of the actual or constructive intent to injure,
the Merryweather rule of "no-contribution" is applied. However,
where one tortfeasor who is only ordinarily negligent has paid more
than his pro rata share, he may recover by way of contribution only
a pro rata share from the grossly negligent tortfeasorY
III. THE PRINCIPAL CASE-"COMPARATIVE CONTRIBUTION"
A. Wisconsin History Of Contribution
The Wisconsin Constitution"7 adopted the common law in force
in Wisconsin at the time of statehood and provided that such com-
mon law could be altered or suspended only by the legislature. How-
ever, in 1864 the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Coburn v. Harvey
stated that only that part of the common law which had been
adopted in the territory at the time of the American Revolution
became part of the common law of Wisconsin." In 1918 Wisconsin
recognized the equitable doctrine of contribution by judicial de-
cision in Ellis v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 9 and, consequently, that
doctrine was subject to change by the courts without legislative
action. In the Ellis case, the court stated that a plaintiff could re-
cover the total amount of the judgment from either of two joint
tortfeasors, and the paying tortfeasor was then entitled to recover a
pro rata share from the remaining tortfeasor, provided the tort did
not involve moral turpitude or a willful or conscious wrong. It was
decided a few years later that such intentional wrongs (the intent
involved being either actual or constructive) included cases where
there was a finding of gross negligence.Y Thus, a tortfeasor found
guilty of gross negligence had no right to contribution from a joint
tortfeasor who was only ordinarily negligent."' Conversely, it would
appear that a tortfeasor guilty of ordinary negligence could recover
only a pro rata share or up to one-half of the loss from one guilty of
gross negligence, even though the latter's wrong obviously con-
"'Prosser, Torts § 46, at 249 (2d ed. 1955).
56Wedel v. Klein, 229 Wis. 419, 282 N.W. 606 (1938).
57 Art. XIV, § 13.
5' 18 Wis. 147 (1864). This view was followed in Cawker v. Dreutzer, 197 Wis. 98,
221 N.W. 401 (1928), where the court refused to be bound by an English decision of
1809 on the ground that it was not a part of the common law of the state.
59 167 Wis. 392, 167 N.W. 1048 (1918). See text accompanying notes 36, 37 supra
for the distinction between "equitable" and "common law" doctrines of contribution.
'0 Bentson v. Brown, 186 Wis. 629, 203 N.W. 380 (1925); see text accompanying note
23 supra.
61 Zurn v. Whatly, 213 Wis. 365, 251 N.W. 435 (1933).
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tributed substantially more to the loss. " However, the question has
never been decided. "3
B. The New "Comparative Contribution" Rule
The instant case changed the 1918 doctrine of contribution. Tort-
feasors sustaining a common liability by reason of negligence are
now held responsible for contribution in proportion to the percentage
of negligence attributable to each. Hence, the number of tortfeasors
is no longer relevant. However, this refinement of the rule of con-
tribution does not change the plaintiff's right to recover the total
amount of his damage from any one defendant-tortfeasor. In ar-
riving at the new doctrine of contribution, the court pointed out
that the comparative negligence statute, governing the relative rights
of a plaintiff vis-a-vis a defendant, had no application to the doctrine
of contribution." Therefore, the comparative contribution rule was
not restricted by those words in the comparative negligence statute
which stated that a plaintiff could recover from a defendant only if
the plaintiff's negligence was not as great as the negligence of the de-
fendant. Also, the court held that under the new comparative con-
tribution rule, the right of one tortfeasor to contribution was not
barred even though his negligence be equal to or greater than the
negligence of his co-tortfeasor.6 '
C. Implementation And Effects Of The New Rule
The Wisconsin courts possess devices of procedure and practice
which make the adoption of the new comparative contribution rule
feasible as well as just for all future litigants. There is wide use
of the special verdict," a means by which the jury finds the facts
only and leaves the judgment to the court."7 By the use of this pro-
cedure the jury can separate a general question into separate and
distinct issues and thereby avoid confusion in determining the
relative degrees of fault of the two or more parties. Special verdicts
(or issues) are especially helpful when several party-defendants are
involved.
62 Ayala v. Farmers Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 272 Wis. 629, 76 N.W.2d 563 (1956).
6 3jacobs v. General Acc. Fire & Life Assur. Corp., 14 Wis. 2d 1, 109 N.W.2d 462
(1961).
64 114 N.W.2d at 107. The comparative negligence statute is found at Wis. Star. Ann.
331.045 (1958).
65 114 N.W.2d at 108.
65 Wis. Stat. Ann. § 270.27 (Supp. 1961).
"7Andrews v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 96 Wis. 348, 71 N.W. 372 (1897). The
"special verdicts" used in Wisconsin are basically the same as "special issues" in other juris-
dictions, e.g., Texas. Compare Ex parte Fisher, 146 Tex. 328, 206 S.W.2d 1000 (1947),
with Bigelow v. Danielson, 102 Wis. 407, 78 N.W. 599 (1889).
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Another practice in Wisconsin, that of allowing automobile lia-
bility insurers to be impleaded for contribution or indemnification
in some actions,"8 will also be helpful in applying the new rule.
Moreover, the application of the comparative negligence statute69
provides helpful precedent.
The use of releases"0 and covenants not to sue" will still be ap-
plicable under the comparative contribution doctrine."1 However,
"in order for a plaintiff to give a release or covenant which will pro-
tect the settling tortfeasor from a claim of contribution, the plaintiff
must agree to satisfy such percentage" of the other tortfeasor's
judgment against the settling tortfeasor which represents the settling
tortfeasor's negligence.73 The court is apparently saying that a plain-
tiff will have to be satisfied with recovering from the non-settling
tortfeasor only the amount of damages which represents the non-
settling tortfeasor's percentage of the total negligence.
D. Effects Of Abolishing The Concept Of Gross Negligence
In the principal case, the court abolished the concept of gross
negligence.74 This will have little effect upon the comparative negli-
gence statute, i.e., plaintiff vis-a-vis defendant. A plaintiff will still
recover only if his contributory -negligence is less than the negligence
of the defendant." Now, however, if the plaintiff's conduct is what
would have been termed "grossly negligent," he can recover if the
defendant is what formerly was termed "more grossly negligent."
If the defendant is guilty of reckless, willful, or wanton conduct, by
treating this conduct as a very high degree of ordinary negligence,
68 Wis. Star. Ann. § 260.11 (1957) states:
In any action for damages caused by the negligent operation, management or
control of a motor vehicle, any insurer of motor vehicles, which has an interest
in the outcome of such controversy adverse to the plaintiff or any of the
parties to such controversy, or which by its policy of insurance assumes or re-
serves the right to control the prosecution, defense or settlement of the claim
or action, or which by its policy agrees to prosecute or defend the action
brought by the plaintiff or any of the parties to such action, or agrees to en-
gage counsel to prosecute or defend said action, or agrees to pay the cost of
such litigation, is by this section made a proper party defendant in any action
brought by plaintiff on account of any claim against the insured.
See Ritterbusch v. Sexmith, 256 Wis. 507, 41 N.W.2d 611 (1950).
6 9 Wis. Stat. Ann. § 331.045 (1958).
76 WiS. Stat. Ann. § 113.04 (1957).
71 See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Continental Cas. Co., 264 Wis. 493, 59 N.W.2d
425, 428 (1953), where the court stated that "a release of one joint tortfeasor reserving
rights against the other joint tortfeasor . . . under § 113.04 is synonymous with covenants
not to sue."
72114 N.W.2d at 111.
7s Ibid.74 Id. at 113.
5 Id. at 107.
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the difference between the two rules in the dollar recovery by an
ordinarily negligent plaintiff would be very small. Under the com-
parative contribution rule, however, the result will at times be
significant. Under the "common law" rule, a grossly negligent de-
fendant could recover one half of the judgment from an ordinarily
negligent co-tortfeasor, even though the former's negligence may have
been ninety-five per cent of the total negligence. Similarly, a joint
tortfeasor guilty of ordinary negligence could recover only one-half
from a grossly negligent co-tortfeasor. By abolishing the concept of
gross negligence, and by making it different only in degree and not
in kind, the joint tortfeasors will be entitled to a comparison of the
degrees of fault and an apportionment of the damages on that basis.
As a result, if a joint tortfeasor were responsible for ninety-five per
cent of the total negligence, he would also be responsible for ninety-
five per cent of the damages as against only fifty per cent under the
pro rata rule. Only by abolishing the willful and wanton concept
of gross negligence and by considering such conduct as a high degree
of ordinary negligence on a comparative basis can an equitable and
fair result be reached in all cases. Admittedly, the result under the
new rule is more just in distributing the loss in proportion to the
degree of negligence or fault which caused it rather than distributing
the loss on a pro rata basis.
Two other aspects of the abolition of the doctrine of gross negli-
gence should be considered. First, in negligence cases the new practice
will do away with the basis for punitive damages,"6 which prior to
this time had to be based on a finding of willfulness, wantonness,
and recklessness, i.e., gross negligence. However, since the primary
purpose of punitive damages was not to compensate the plaintiff for
his injuries but to punish and deter the wrongdoer,77 the void left
by the absence of a provision for exemplary damages could be satis-
factorily filled by the criminal laws of the state, according to the
court in the instant case." The court also stated that it was doubt-
ful (1) if potential tortfeasors were aware of the possibility of
punitive damages, and (2) if they were aware, whether they re-
flected upon such a possibility or whether their conduct was deterred
or altered by it,7" especially since some liability insurance policies
provide for payment of punitive damages.
7 1d. at 113.
7 Prosser, Torts § 2, at 9 (2d ed. 1955).
7 114 N.W.2d at 113; see Wis. Stat. Ann. § 940.06 (dealing with homicide by reckless
conduct), and § 941.20 (reckless use of weapons) (1958); see also Tex. Pen. Code Ann.
§ 802 (driving while intoxicated), § 1149 (assault with a motor vehicle), and § 1231
(negligent homicide) (1961).
79114 N.W.2d at 113.
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A second significant aspect of the abolition of the doctrine of
gross negligence arises under section 17 of the Bankruptcy Act."
Although most judgments, including those rendered in cases in-
volving ordinary negligence, can be discharged in bankruptcy, de-
crees finding liability for willful and malicious injury to the person
or property of another cannot be so discharged."' Now, because of
the abolition of "gross" negligence, debts arising from any degree
of negligence will be dischargeable. However, the court felt that the
benefits derived from abolishing the doctrine of gross negligence out-
weighed the possible inequity that would result from the relatively




Texas has no comparative negligence statute." Legislation to that
effect has been introduced in the Texas House of Representatives on
five separate occasions, 4 but each time the bill has been defeated.
Consequently, in the absence of comparative negligence, contribu-
tory negligence on the part of the plaintiff is an absolute defense in
Texas unless the defendant is found guilty of gross negligence."
However, the suggestion that juries often allow recovery in cases
when the plaintiff is contributorily negligent and the defendant not
grossly negligent is not an incredible one." The jury simply finds
that the plaintiff is not negligent but reduces his recovery.
Although Texas does not have a comparative negligence statute of
general application, it has enacted an employer's liability statute " - -
applicable to railroad employees-which abolishes contributory negli-
gence as an absolute defense and allows apportionment of damages."
"030 Stat. 550 (1898), 11 U.S.C. § 35 (Supp. II, 1961).
8130 Star. 550 (1898), 11 U.S.C. § 35(a) (2) (Supp. II, 1961).
82 114 N.W.2d at 114.
"
3 Alexander v. Appell Drilling Co., 290 S.W.2d 377 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956) error ref.
n.r.e.84 H.B. 122 (1959); H.B. 228 (1957); H.B. 101 (1953); H.B. 390 (1951); H.B. 462
(1941).
"
5 Brown & Root v. Duncan, 40 S.W.2d 244 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931). In Gulf, C. & S.F.
Ry. Co. v. Hamilton, 57 S.W.2d 309, 312 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933), error dism. w.o.j., 126
Tex. 542, 89 S.W.2d 208 (1936), the court stated: Gross negligence is "the exercise of so
slight a degree of care as to justify the belief that there was an indifference to the interest
and welfare of others."
"8 "We but blind our eyes to the obvious reality to the extent that we ignore the fact
that in many cases juries apply it [apportionment] in spite of us." Holt, J., in Haeg v.
Sprague, Warner & Co., 202 Minn. 425, 430, 281 N.W. 261, 263 (1938).
87 Ibid.
'8 Tex. Rev. Civ. Star. Ann. art. 6440 (1926).
"
9 Pope v. St. Louis Sw. Ry., 106 Tex. 52, 155 S.W. 1175 (1913).
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Also, it is interesting to note that in March of 1961 a suit" was
brought in a Texas district court under the Texas Wrongful Death
Statute,' the Survival Statute," and under general maritime law
to recover damages for the death of a longshoreman. The Texas
Supreme Court held that in an action under the Wrongful Death
Statute, if the general maritime law doctrine of comparative negli-
gence would have applied in favor of the decedent had he lived,
then this doctrine would apply in favor of his dependants, and
contributory negligence of the decedent could be considered only in
mitigation of damages." The court was faced with a question of
first impression in Texas, and since the relevant federal cases" were
evenly divided, it could easily have refused to permit the utilization
of comparative negligence. However, it did not, and this use of the
doctrine stands as the only instance, outside of the employer's liability
act, in which Texas courts have applied comparative negligence."
B. Contribution
Texas has a contribution statute" which provides for distribution
of damages among joint tortfeasors on a pro rata basis." The "equity"
rule is applied in determining the pro rata shares." If the plaintiff
brings suit against only one of the wrongdoers, the defendant may
implead the other wrongdoer and seek contribution." The plaintiff
may recover from either or both of the joint tortfeasors, i.e., they
are jointly and severally liable.' However, for example, where one
of three joint tortfeasors pays the plaintiff, the paying tortfeasor is
not entitled to recover from any one of the other two co-tortfeasors
two-thirds of the amount paid by him, rather, he may recover from
9OVassallo v. Nederl-Amerik Stoomv Maats Holland, 162 Tex. 52, 344 S.W.2d 421
(1961), noted, 16 Sw. L.J. 675 (1962).
O"Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4671 (1940).
2 Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 5525 (1958).
9'Vassallo v. Nederl-Amerik Stoomv Maats Holland, 162 Tex. 52, 344 S.W.2d 421
(1961). For a complete treatment of the case, see 16 Sw. L.J. 675 (1962).
" The court declined to follow the construction of recovery under the Wrongful Death
Act accepted by the Fifth Circuit in Truelson v. Whitney & Bodden Shipping Co., 10 F.2d
412 (5th Cir. 1926). Instead, it quoted portions of a 1959 opinion of the Fourth Circuit in
Holley v. The Manfred Stansfield, 269 F.2d 317 (4th Cir. 1959). The court there stated:
"This statute was intended . . . to grant recovery in all instances where a decedent would
have recovered. The statute appears not to concern itself with which law, local or maritime,
would have supported the recovery, but only whether there would have been a recovery."
id. at 321.
"See Flaiz v. Moore, - Tex. -, 359 S.W.2d 872 (1962), which cites the Vassallo
case.
'0 Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 2212 (1950).
" Wheeler v. Glazer, 137 Tex. 341, 153 S.W.2d 449 (1941).
" See text accompanying note 37 supra.
" Lottman v. Cuilla, 288 S.W. 123 (Tex. Comm. App. 1926).
'00 Bentley v. Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co., 174 F.2d 788 (5th Cir. 1949).
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each of the other tortfeasors only one-third of the total amount. 1' In
one case the Texas Supreme Court stated in dictum that contribu-
tion did not apply if there was a difference between the character of
the wrong and the quality of the conduct of the parties.10"
By using a covenant not to sue, a plaintiff may preclude recovery
from one of several tortfeasors without barring his action against the
remaining tortfeasors, provided the amount paid for the covenant is
not in full satisfaction of his damages.' The settling tortfeasor may
then proceed against the non-settling tortfeasor or tortfeasors for
contribution or indemnification. In such an action, the amount al-
ready paid the plaintiff under the settlement is deducted from the
total amount of damages if it is equal to or greater than one-half
of such damages. If the amount paid under the settlement is less than
one-half the amount of the total damages, the plaintiff may recover
from the non-settling tortfeasor only up to one-half of the total
amount set as damages, because the plaintiff has accepted the settle-
ment in satisfaction of the settling tortfeasor's liability for one-half. 4
C. The Concept Of Gross Negligence
The abolition of the concept of gross negligence in Texas would
have a definite effect upon two areas of negligence: (1) contributory
negligence; and (2) the guest statute. As noted, the principles of
gross negligence have been applied to relieve the inherent harshness
of the doctrine of contributory negligence.' Without gross negli-
gence, a plaintiff who was only slightly negligent would be com-
pletely barred from recovery against a defendant who was grossly
negligent. This result could in no way be considered just. Therefore,
Texas allows a plaintiff who is guilty of contributory negligence to
recover from a defendant who is grossly negligent.'
Texas also has a guest statute' which prohibits an automobile
passenger who is found to be a guest from recovering damages from
the operator of the automobile unless the operator causes injury to
"' Maresh v. Jennings, 38 S.W.2d 406 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931) error ref.
'0' Wheeler v. Glazer, 137 Tex. 341, 153 S.W.2d 449, 451 (1941): "While the law does
not seem to take note of the quantity of the negligence of the different tortfeasors as a
reason for authorizing the one least negligent to have contribution from the other, the
authorities do recognize a distinction in the quality of their negligence." (Emphasis added.)
The court then cited Gregg v. City of Wilmington, 155 N.C. 18, 70 S.E. 1070 (1911);
Zulkee v. Wing, 20 Wis. 408 (1866); 18 C.J.S. Contribution S 11 (1938); 10 Tex. Jur.
Contribution 554 (1936). No other cases were found on this point.
"'Bradshaw v. Baylor Univ., 126 Tex. 99, 84 S.W.2d 703 (1935).
'°4Gattegno v. The Parisian, 53 S.W.2d 1005 (Tex. Comm. App. 1932).
"' Prosser, Torts § 51 (2d ed. 1955).
"0 See cases cited note 85 supra.
507Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 6701b (1953).
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the passenger by his heedlessness or reckless disregard for the rights
of others." 8 The abolition of the concept of gross negligence would
require an amendment of the present guest statute. Such abolition
would have either one of two possible results: (1) it would com-
pletely bar a passenger from recovering damages from the operator
of the vehicle no matter how gross his negligence might have been;
or (2) it would eliminate any bar to a suit between a passenger and
an operator. However, considering the purpose and intent of the
present guest statute, the latter alternative would seem to be unlikely.
D. Comparative Contribution
Is it feasible to adopt the comparative contribution doctrine in a
jurisdiction such as Texas which does not already employ a general
comparative negligence doctrine? Although Texas does not have a
general comparative negligence doctrine as between plaintiff and
defendant, the apportionment of damages according to the degrees
of fault is already applied in two instances: (1) under federal..
and state... employer's liability statutes; and (2) under general mari-
time law.' Moreover, Texas has special issues or special verdicts1'
similar to those in Wisconsin,1" and these would aid in the practical
application of the comparative contribution rule by eliminating pos-
sible confusion of the jury, especially in a multi-party suit. There-
fore, it is feasible to adopt by statute14 the new comparative con-
tribution doctrine in Texas, and such legislation is recommended.
Contribution based solely upon the number of tortfeasors with no
regard for the relative degrees of fault of the wrongdoers is unjust.
Just as liability for negligence is based upon actual causation, a joint
tortfeasor should be held liable only for that portion of the total
damages which he causes. Comparative contribution is pragmatically
sound. It is a workable doctrine which, by employing certain pro-
cedural devices, will normally result in an equitable division of dam-
ages. It is true that the adoption of such a doctrine would tend to dis-
rupt a well established rule. However, this argument assumes that
what is is right. As Mr. Justice Holmes once stated: "It is revolting to
have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down
10' Wood v. Orts, 182 S.W.2d 139 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944).
80935 Stat. 66 (1908), 45 U.S.C. § 53 (1959).
"o Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 6440 (1926).
... See text accompanying note 95 supra.
"'. Tex. R. Civ. P. 290.
11 See text accompanying note 67 supra.
114 The present Texas contribution doctrine is based upon statute, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat.
Ann. art. 2212 (1950), and therefore legislative action would be necessary.
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in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds
upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the rule
simply persists from blind imitation of the past.'...
William F. Russell
115 Holmes, The Path of the Law, in Collected Legal Papers 167, 187 (1920), quoted in
the principal case at 114 N.W.2d 109.
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